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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.U

JOSEPH L. MILLS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14496

vs,
C. N. OTTOSEN, Commissioner
of Insurance and the STATE OF
UTAH, by and through its
Insurance Department,
Defendants-Appellants,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action involves the review of an Order of the
Commissioner of Insurance suspending certain insurance licenses
issued to plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff initiated this action to review an administrative Order of the Commissioner of Insurance suspending an
insurance agent's and broker's license.

On appeal to the

District Court, the case was heard de novo pursuant to §31-4-9
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U.C.A. 1953.

Upon hearing the evidence, the Court issued its

Decision and Order directing that plaintiff1s licenses be
reinstated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the
Trial Court.

Respondent seeks an order affirming that judg-

ment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants1 Statement of Facts is correct but
incomplete.

We shall restate the facts of the case to include

uncontroverted evidence deemed to be pertinent to the Trial
Court's decision.
The transaction out of which the alleged violation
arose was one in which Mr. Mills was requested by one Larry
Bradshaw to secure a contractor's performance bond on a construction project.

Mr. Mills had done business with Mr.

Bradshaw for a period of approximately 10 years.

(R. 35.) The

project in question was known as the Garden Square Project,
a shopping center owned by one H. Shirl Wright and Commercial
Enterprises, Inc.

Wright and Commercial as ovmers had entered

into a general construction contract with Riddco Company as
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general contractor by the terms of which the latter agreed to
construct the shopping center on a cost plus basis.
1-D.)

(Exhibit

The construction money was provided by Valley Mortgage

Company.

Although the general contract did not require the

contractor to provide a performance bond, the lender required
such a bond as a condition to the interim financing.

(R. 43.)

Upon execution of the construction contract, Mr. Bradshaw,
acting for the general contractor, Riddco, contacted Mr. Mills
and asked that he obtain a corporate surety performance bond.
(R. 45.)

Financial statements on Riddco were provided for

Mr. Mills1 use in securing the bond.

Mr. Mills attempted to

place this bond with several insurance companies (St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Fidelity and Deposit Company
of Maryland and Fireman's Fund).

None of these companies

would accept the risk because the project owner, Shirl Wright,
was also a stockholder and principal of the contractor, Riddco.
(R. 73, 74.)

In the interim, while Mills was attempting to

secure the performance bond of a corporate surety, Valley
Mortgage disbursed two monthly construction draws but informed
the contractor that it would make no further disbursement until
a bond had been secured.

(R. 45.)

Bradshaw called Mills in

September of 1975 and became angry with Mills because the
latter had been unable to secure a bond.

(R. 46.)
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Neither

Bradshaw nor Mills considered that there was any significant
risk for a surety because of the common identity of the owner
and contractor and the fact that it was a cost-plus job.
(R. 44, 76.)

It was at this time that Mr. Mills as an accom-

modation to Mr. Bradshaw agreed to sign the bond himself as
surety if the lending institution was willing to accept his
signature.

(R. 47, 75.) Mills fully understood that he would

be liable on the bond although he did not consider that there
was any appreciable risk (R. 76) and Bradshaw knew that there
were no resources behind the signature of Mills as surety
except for his personal resources.

(R. 47.)

No one has ever

claimed that any one was misled into believing that an insurance company was on the risk as surety.

(See R. 47, 56.)

It was simply a question of whether the bank was willing to
accept Mills1 personal guarantee of the obligation.

The

bank received the bond and was aware from the outset that
Mills or his personal company (Mills, Gundry & Associates) was
the surety on the obligation and that no insurance company
was obligated by the bond.

(R. 56.)

The bank was unwilling

to accept the personal bond of Mills and that bond was, therefore, rejected.

Neither the bank nor the contractor were

ever able to secure a bond and the bank later waived its requirement for a performance bond.

(R. 57.)
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Mills testified that the signing of the bond was
an extraordinary transaction for him; that he was not in the
business of signing bonds; that he agreed to provide the
bond with the understanding that the bank would accept his
personal guarantee; that he agreed to perform this service
as an accommodation and without any remuneration to him and
that he did not bill and was never paid any sum of money or
other consideration for his accommodation.

(R. 78, 79.)

The matter came before the Insurance Commission
when a representative of the bank delivered the bond to the
Insurance Commissioner.

As a result of that, an investiga-

tion was undertaken and the Insurance Commissioner concluded
that there had been a violation of the insurance lax^s and
that Mr. Mills' licenses as an insurance agent should be
suspended.
1975.

An Order to that effect was entered October 28,

The case was duly appealed to the District Court.
At the time of the Suspension Order Mr. Mills was

49 years of age and had been engaged in the insurance business
for over 20 years.
children.

(R. 71.) Mr. Mills was married with four

He was doing business through a small company

owned by two families, Mills-Gundry & Associates, Inc.

The

Insurance Commissioner forwarded notice of the Suspension
Order to the various companies which Mr. Mills represented and
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these companies suspended their licenses with Mills and "told
him to get out of business11.

(R. 80.) Mr. Mills was thereby

forced to negotiate the sale of his share of the insurance
business to his partner, Mr. Gundry.

He estimates that the

forced sale of his interest in the business brought about an
economic loss of $100,000.00.

(R. 81.)

To his further injury

he was out of business overnight and forced into another
occupation in order to earn a livelihood.

His income was

abruptly reduced from approximately $2,000.00 per month to
less than $1,000.00 per month.

(R. 80-81.)

In addition to

the economic loss, the suspension of his professional licenses
brought public embarrassment and humiliation particularly in
light of civic and church positions which he held at the time
of the Order.

(R. 82.)

The findings of the Trial Court indicate some doubt
in the mind of the Court as to whether there had been a violation of the Insurance Code.

The Court made no specific finding

or conclusion either that there was or was not a violation.
(R. 15-16.)

There was a specific finding, however, that even

assuming a violation, the continued suspension of the licenses
would be disproportionate to any offense that might have
occurred and the Court directed reinstatement of these licenses.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF DID NOT VIOLATE THE INSURANCE CODE
Plaintiff's counsel has some difficulty in determining
from the arguments advanced at the District Court hearing and
in the appellants1 brief exactly what violations of the Insurance Code are claimed to have occurred in this case.

Various

sections of the Code are quoted in appellants' Statement of
the Law (Pages 5-7, Appellants1 Brief) but appellants1 argument
does not relate the facts of the case to the abstract statements
of law which are quoted.

The Commission's Suspension Order of

October 28, 1975, refers only to §§31-17-50(b)(h)(i) and 31-27-6,
U.C.A. 1953.

(R. 4-5.)

These sections are discussed in the

following pages of this brief.
Appellants' argument generally proceeds upon the statements that Mills was guilty of "pawning a $1,000,000.00 phony
bond...as a surety bond" and that he violated some duty (not
defined by appellants) which was owed to the lending institution
in resolving a "conflict in his favor" by executing the bond,
thereby creating an "exposure to the bank".

(Page 8, Appellants'

Brief.)
We find no violation of any provisions of the Insurance
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Code in the transaction here involved.

The performance bond

executed by Mr. Mills is just as enforceable by the obligee
as it would have been had a corporate surety executed the obligation.

This was not a

l!

phony M bond.

Mr. Mills 1 guarantee as

a surety was certainly not as valuable a guarantee as that of
a qualified insurer but everyone understood that the obligation
did not require any insurance company to respond and was backed
only by the resources of Mills (and/or his personal company).
The signing of the bond was expressly predicated upon the
assumption that it should have no effect unless the bank was
willing to accept Mills as surety.
not misled.

(R. 4 7 , 75.)

The bank was

They knew that Mills (or his company) was the only

obligor and were never led to believe that there was any insurance carrier behind the obligation.

(R. 56.)

We find no provision in the Insurance Code which makes
it unlawful for an individual to become an obligor on a suretytype obligation.

As the Court knows, it is common practice for

individuals not qualified as insurers to execute bonds as
sureties (i.e., attachment and garnishment bonds, e t c . ) .

As

might be expected, the proscription of the Insurance Code is
that no person may engage as an "insurer 11 without compliance
with the requirements of the insurance laws.
1953.)

(§31-5-2, U.C.A.

An "insurer" is defined as follows (§31-1-10, U.C.A.,

1953):
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'Insurer1 includes every person engaged as
indemnitor, surety, or contractor in the
business of entering into contracts of
insurance or annuity..." (Emphasis added.)
There is no argument nor is there any evidence in
this case that Mills has engaged "in the business of entering
into contracts of insurance."

His signing of the bond in this

instance was without any expectation of compensation and was
an isolated and extraordinary occurrence which was not a part
of his ordinary business.

The term "business" is generally

considered to be an activity, occupation or employment regularly
engaged in as a livelihood or for profit [see Cases Collected
5A Words & Phrases, Pages 596, et seq.]

These elements are

not present in this transaction any more than they would have
been had a doctor or lawyer executed the bond under the same
circumstances.
In answer to the appellants1 argument that some duty
was owed to the bank and that the bank was unreasonably subjected to a risk, we simply respond that there is no evidence
whatever of any deception or attempt to deceive on the part of
Mills.

Mills stated from the outset that the bank must be

willing to accept his personal guarantee.

(R. 47, 75.) The

witness from the bank testified that he was not misled and
that he knew there was no insurance company on the bond.
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(R. 56

The Commissioner's Suspension Order of October 28,
1976, cites §§31-17-50(b)(h)(i) and 31-27-6 as the sections
of the Code allegedly violated by Mr. Mills.

Section 31-27-6,

U.C.A. 1953, provides:
M

No person who is not an insurer shall
assume or use any name which deceptively
infers or suggests that it is an insurer.11
Although this statute is cited, no argument is made that the
facts of the transaction are pertinent to the citation.
Neither the name "Joseph L. Mills11 nor "Mills, Gundry &
Associates" deceptively infers that the user "is an insurer".
The Commissioner of Insurance has heretofore licensed "Joseph
L. Mills" as an agent and has licensed "Mills, Gundry &
Associates" as a broker without any exception to the use of
those names.
Section 31-17-50(b)(h) and (i), U.C.A. 1953 provides
that the Commissioner may suspend or revoke licenses if the
licensee willfully violates any provision of the Insurance
Code (Sub-Section (b)) or "has shown himself..."incompetent or
untrustworthy, a source of injury and loss to the public"
(Sub-Section (h)) or deals with insurance outside the scope
of his licenses (Sub-Section (i)). As heretofore noted, there
was no violation of the Insurance Code.

The conduct of the

plaintiff in this instance was certainly not evidence of "incompetency," did not disclose that he was "untrustworthy" and did
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not show that there was any "injury and loss to the public".
In signing the performance bond, he did only what he had a
right to do and there was no element of bad faith, concealment,
non-disclosure or attempt to deceive.

Finally, there was no

"dealing" [selling] of any type of insurance outside the scope
of the licenses.

In signing the bond, Mills was not acting

as a commissioned salesman of insurance.
We see no evidence in the transaction of any violation
of the provisions of the Insurance Code or of any conduct on
the part of Mr. Mills which justifies the suspension of his
insurance licenses.
POINT II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PLAINTIFF VIOLATED
THE INSURANCE CODE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE CASE ARE SUCH AS TO WARRANT THE TRIAL
COURT!S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION TO REINSTATE THE PLAINTIFFfS LICENSES.
Even assuming that Mr. Mills was found to be "guilty
of violation of the law", the District Court is granted discretion to require reinstatement of the agent's and broker's
licenses "if it deems the suspension or revocation too severe
a penalty under the facts as found."

(§31-4-14, U.C.A. 1953.)

That is exactly what the Court did in this instance.

Mills

acted in good faith and with a desire to accommodate a friend
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and client and without profit to himself.

The extreme to

which the Commissioner went in this case is illustrated in
part by the fact that he suspended the licenses for a period
of 18 months (R. 4-5) even though he only had statutory
authority to suspend for 12 months.
1953.)

?i

'j " r s ! *

(§31-17-51, U.C.A.

The Suspension Order had the effect of destroying a

-

professional reputation and a business built over a period
of more than 20 years.

The fact that the Commissioner

challenges the Court's discretion to grant relief under these
circumstances is evidence of his totally unreasonable attitude
toward Mr. Mills and his inability to view the situation with
objectivity and basic fairness.

The statutory discretion of

the Court was properly exercised.

CONCLUSION

••-''''•"

*

It is respectfully submitted that there was no violation of the Insurance Code and that even assuming a violation,
the facts fully warrant the District Court's finding that: continued suspension of the licenses was

!l

too severe a penalty 11 .

The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submit^p^H' LtirsvJrd day of September, 1976,
VAN COTT, ikAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCAKBHY

Gra^^l^a7?^rTane, J t l v . ^
Atto^Aeys for Plaintiff-\
Res^pndent
N^^)
141 East First South
^
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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